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Abstract
We consider the question whether pupils from the lower social strata perform better in  
private government-dependent schools than in public or private-independent schools,  
using the PISA 2000 data on European high schools. In the eighty’s, Coleman and  
Hoffer (1987) found in the USA that the performance of these pupils was better at  
religious schools than at comparable public schools. Dronkers and Robert (2003) found  
in PISA-data for 19 comparable countries that private government-dependent schools  
are more effective then comparable public schools, also after controlled for  
characteristics of pupils and parents and the social composition of the school. The  
main explanation appeared to be a better school climate in private government-
dependent schools. Private independent schools were less effective than comparable  
public schools, but only after controlling for the social composition of the school. As a  
follow-up we now investigate, again with the PISA-data of these 19 countries, whether  
this positive effect of private government-dependent schools differs between pupils from  
different strata. We use various indicators to measure social strata: social, cultural  
and economic. We expect that the thesis of Coleman & Hoffer does hold for private  
government-dependent schools, because in these 19 countries they are mostly religious  
schools, which have more opportunities to form functional communities and create  
social capital. But for private independent schools, which due to their commercial  
foundation are less often functional communities, this relation is not expected to hold.  
However, the results show that public and private schools have mostly the same effects  
for the same kind of pupils and thus mostly not favor one kind of pupils above another  
kind of pupils. But private government-dependent schools are slightly more effective for  
pupils with less cultural capital. However,  private independent schools are also more  
effective for pupils from large families or low status families.
Introduction
Within the field of school effectiveness research, the research on differences in 
effectiveness of different types of schools has taken a special position: probably 
few subjects within the sociology of education have created such controversies as 
the research on effectiveness of private and public schools. A subtopic of this 
discussion that may be even more controversial concerns questions about the 
effectiveness of private versus public schools for different groups of pupils, and 
especially pupils from the lower strata of society.  A related question is whether 
private schools that exist alongside public schools can increase or decrease 
educational inequality with regard to social class. In the United States, the 
discussion on these so-called differential school effects is closely related to the 
rather intense “Parental Choice” policy debate, and virtually all of the research 
on this topic has concentrated on the American situation. In European countries 
the coexistence of private owned but public funded education with public 
education and fully private education is more common, but also in these countries 
there exist ongoing policy debates on for example the tensions between religious 
and public education and the consequences of educational segregation that are 
related to the effectiveness of different school types. This shows that the question 
of differential school effects should not be limited to the United States.
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The cross-national PISA data that have recently become available allow us to 
address these questions in a broader international context. In this we build on the 
earlier study using the same data by Dronkers and Robert (2003) who examined 
differences in effectiveness between private and public schools across 19 
comparable nations. Their main results were that the gross higher effectiveness of 
the private independent schools could be fully explained by their better social 
composition. But private government-dependent schools were more net effective 
than comparable public schools with the same students and social composition. 
The main explanation of this higher net effectiveness was the better school 
climate. These net effectiveness differences between public and private school-
sectors were equal across nations, despite the historical and juridical differences 
of their educational systems (see below). As a consequence of this latter result of 
Dronkers and Robert we can argue that the various school-sectors in these 19 
comparable societies function in analogous ways.
We now extend this research by asking whether private and public schools 
differ in their effects on pupils from the lower strata. Given the equal 
effectiveness differences between public and private school-sectors across these 
nations we don’t focus again on cross-national differences.
Public and private education
Within the educational systems of Western industrial societies, schools can be 
roughly categorized on two dimensions. On one hand, the issue is who takes 
decisions concerning the organization and curricula that schools provide; on the 
other hand, who finances this education. In relation to the first issue, two types 
of schools have emerged in most western countries. As a result of the struggle 
between the state and the established church, states have taken on the 
responsibility of organizing education. Here lies the root of public education that 
is fully governed and financed by public agencies (Archer, 1984). At the same 
time however, for different reasons schools have been established by private 
initiatives, as a result of the efforts of churches and other religious institutions,  
but also of ideological or commercial organizations. Although this type of 
schools will often still have to comply with government regulations to a certain 
extent (partly also depending on the amount of financial support by the 
government, as will be discussed later), the crucial decisions regarding the 
school’s affairs are made by private entities. Within the private sector, schools 
can again be classified as either government-dependent or government-
independent by the extent to which they are subsidized by the state. Subsidizing 
of private schools by governments is in many countries secured by law, either in 
the constitution (The Netherlands, Germany) or in common law (like in France 
for example). In many cases this right results from the claims of mostly religious 
groups to education based on the values and ideologies of the parents who are 
part of these groups, and who are considered to be responsible for the way their  
children are raised. Alongside these private government-dependent schools, there 
exist in a number of countries private schools that do not receive any government 
support, and that where mostly established for non-religious reasons by parents 
or organizations who have special pedagogical ideologies or societal aims. These 
schools finance themselves by means of pupil fees, donations, sponsoring and the 
like. As we said before, the two dimensions – governance and financing – cannot 
be considered to completely independent: when the amount of financial support 
of private schools by governments becomes larger, these governments will also 
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demand a higher degree of influence on the programs that the schools offer. But 
even schools that are completely independent financially will generally not be 
completely free to determine the contents of their programs, and will have to 
comply with minimal requirements on quality and safety. Moreover, the social 
context will also place constraints on school’s freedom: for example diploma’s 
that meet generally accepted standards have become indispensable in modern 
societies.
The different types of schools described here can be seen as being the result of 
two different approaches to schooling. According to one point of view, schooling 
is an instrument of society as a whole (as represented by the central state) to 
prepare individuals for a life within society, independent of their social 
background, and in which religious convictions are considered to be a private 
matter. Public education results from this point of view. The competing 
standpoint states that schools are not just an instrument of society,  but also of 
parents or the social and cultural groups to which they belong. The aim of 
schooling according to this point of view is to offer young people an education 
that is in accordance with the way of life of their parents and their environment.  
Private education is related to this approach (Coleman & Hoffer 1987, Godwin & 
Kemerer 2002).
Differences in school effectiveness between school types
A range of previous research shows that there are differences between the 
effectiveness of different types of schools: in many cases, the scholastic 
achievement of pupils appears to be higher at private dependent schools then at 
public schools. In an overview of European research, Dronkers (2004) concludes 
that this is the case in Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Scotland, 
and to some lesser extent in Germany. In a recent cross national analysis using 
the PISA 2000 data, Dronkers and Robert (2003) also find that there are 
differences between the school types: while private government-dependent 
schools appear to be more effective then public schools, these are in turn more 
effective then private government-independent schools. These differences 
become less strong, but do not disappear when controlled for differences in pupil 
characteristics and the composition of the pupil population. In other, mostly 
American research comparable results are found (see for example Coleman, 
Kilgore & Hoffer 1982, Coleman & Hoffer 1987, Bryk, Lee & Holland 1993). In 
research on Latin-American countries however no differences were found 
(Somers, McEwan, & Willms, 2004).
For these results – that are not uncontroversial, see Sørensen & Morgan, 2000 – 
several explanations have been provided in the literature. In the first place, 
differences in effectiveness between schools could be explained by differences in 
the characteristics of pupils. Because private schools are more likely to demand 
pupil fees, they are more likely to attract pupils from the higher social-economic 
strata, resulting in better scholastic achievement on average. Moreover, the 
composition of schools regarding the background characteristics of the pupils 
plays an independent role: schools that have a relatively high number of “good” 
pupils will build up a good academic reputation that will attract better teachers 
(and even more good pupils), and there will be less factors that disturb the 
educational process; it will for example be less necessary to repeat the same 
subject-matter over and over again then at schools that have a less favorable 
pupil composition. Second, it is possible that private schools can provide better 
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learning circumstances, like a more extensive curriculum or less pupils per 
teacher. Third, differences related to school climate might explain differences in 
scholastic achievement between schools. Since in most countries (with Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands as obvious exemptions) public education is most 
standard, attending a private school will be the result of a deliberate choice made 
by the parents. It can be expected that the values and expectations of pupils at 
private schools will be more similar than those of pupils and teachers at public 
schools. This will in turn lead to a better school climate including types of 
behavior of both pupils and teachers that improve scholastic achievement.
The study by Dronkers and Robert (2003) shows that several of these factors 
play a role. Differences in background characteristics and school composition 
effectiveness between public and private schools appear to be able to account for 
a large part of the effectiveness differences between schools, and can even 
explain the difference between public schools and private independent schools 
fully. In fact, private independent schools even appear to be less effective then 
public schools, considering the favorable composition of their pupil population. 
Controlling for differences in learning conditions does not influence the 
remaining differences between public and private dependent schools; however it 
appears that differences in school climate can account for these remaining 
differences. For this reason Dronkers and Robert consider this factor the most 
important explanation of effectiveness differences between public and private 
government-dependent schools.
The Coleman-Hoffer thesis: functional communities and social capital
The school climate argument shows some resemblance to Coleman and Hoffer’s 
main thesis in their study of American school careers. In the eighties they 
concluded not only that religious (mostly catholic) private schools were more 
effective for the average pupil, but also that it were the pupils from the lower 
social-economic strata that appeared to benefit most from private education. This 
finding (although not unchallenged – in a later study Hoffer (1998) did not find 
any such interaction effect) seems to contradict the commonly held presumption 
that it would be that public schools that offer the relatively better opportunities  
to pupils from low social classes. After all the public schools are supposed to 
provide a decent education to everyone, while private schools are focusing on 
specific subgroups of society.
The explanation for this effect according to the authors can be found in social 
capital. They distinguish between two types of communities as related to schools: 
functional communities and value communities. The members of functional 
communities constitute a structural system of social interaction: they encounter 
each other in different kinds of social situations and know each other personally.  
Functional communities display, in other words, a high level of network density.  
As a result, within functional communities there exists a high level of value 
consistency: there is a consensus on the values and expectations regarding (in 
this case) education. In contrast, value communities are communities which 
members (parents and teachers) share values and expectations regarding 
education, but that do not constitute functional communities: outside the school, 
there is no structural interaction or social network between the members.
According to Coleman and Hoffer, functional communities can be beneficent 
to their members because of the social capital they offer: because there is 
interaction between parents inside and outside the school, norms can be 
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maintained that create a stable and positive school climate, improving the pupils’ 
scholastic achievement. This school climate consists (among other things) of a 
sense of order, an atmosphere oriented at learning, and of a clear idea of what is 
expected of pupils, which implies a clear and focused curriculum.
This social capital provided by the school is different from the human capital  
(education and resources of the parents) and social capital (support of children in 
their educational career) that exists within families. While pupils with favorable 
backgrounds in this regard will learn the right behavior in their families and 
make the choices that favor scholastic achievement without help from school, 
pupils without such a background need the social capital that is provided by the 
school to develop the right behavior and to make the right choices. Most likely,  
those will be the pupils from the lower social strata. Thus social capital provided 
by the school is more often a necessary condition for school success to low class 
pupils, while it will at its best only a complement to the already available 
resources of the pupils from the higher social strata.
The differences between schools could now be explained by the differences in 
the social structures that surround different types of schools. Private government-
dependent schools resemble the religious (Catholic) schools of Coleman and 
Hoffer’s survey, where (at least a part of) the parents connected to the school 
would attend the same church. This constitutes the functional community in 
which such schools are embedded, that generate the social capital that – through 
a favorable school climate – especially improve the scholastic achievement of 
pupils from the lower social strata. Public schools and private independent 
schools, in contrast, will generally not be part of functional communities: the 
parents of pupils at these schools have chosen these schools for their own reasons 
but do not constitute communities outside the school, and therefore these schools 
lack the social capital that is able to maintain a favorable school climate.
This mechanism would thus explain why pupils from the lower strata perform 
relatively better at the (mostly religious) private dependent schools, which leads 
to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Scholastic achievement of pupils from the lower social strata is better on 
private government-dependent schools then on public schools.
Private government-independent schools are not expected to be embedded in 
functional communities. Therefore, we do not expect lower class pupils to 
perform relatively better on this type of schools. There is even reason to expect 
that private independent schools have less social capital on offer then public 
schools: because the choice for a private-independent school will more often be a 
deliberate choice made by parents who live relatively far apart, these schools are 
less likely to attract pupils from the immediate surroundings then do public 
schools. For this reason, lower class pupils have more opportunities to benefit  
from social capital (caused by a local community) then do pupils at private 
independent schools. Hence our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Scholastic achievement of pupils from the lower social strata is less good on 
private government-independent schools then on public schools.
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As in research on school effectiveness in general, empirical evidence for these 
two hypotheses is mixed. Although they appeared to hold for American schools 
during the eighties, Hoffer (1998) did not found any interaction effects in later 
research. For Dutch schools differences were found, but could not be explained 
by through network effects (Dijkstra, Veenstra & Peschar, 2004). Van Houtte 
(2004) similarly did not find any differences in social capital between Flemish 
catholic and public schools.  In the following, we test the hypotheses again from 
a more international perspective and with recent data.
Data
In order to test the two hypotheses specified earlier we use the data from the 
PISA 2000 survey. In the PISA project, coordinated by the OECD, 15-year old 
pupils from 32 OECD countries are tested on skills and surveyed on their 
personal circumstances on a three year basis in a large number of OECD 
countries (32 in the first round of 2000), while at the same time information is 
collected on schools by surveying superintendents.
The survey consists of a stratified two-step survey of schools with 15 year old 
pupils, in which all 15-year old pupils and the superintendents of the selected 
schools are interviewed. The data files and SPSS syntax files including the full 
answers of all individual pupils and superintendents are available from the OECD 
website2. We have combined these data files into one file. In addition to the 
original variables the PISA researchers have created a number of aggregate 
indicators, based on the answers of pupils and superintendents. Information on 
these indices and their reliability can be found in the Manual for PISA 2000  
Database and the PISA 2000 Technical Report,  both available from the OECD 
webpage. We chose to use these generally accepted indicators in or analyses,  
rather then to develop our own indicators.
The use of these data has some important advantages. In the first place, the 
questionnaire (including the test) that was used was fully standardized, which 
makes the data comparable between the different schools and countries. This 
allows for abstraction from the specific national contexts, and so yielding a better  
test of the hypotheses that can be more easily generalized. Earlier research on 
school effects was mostly limited to the national context of a single country, and 
in the case of differential effects this country was almost exclusively the United 
States. A second advantage is that cross-national data produce a larger variance 
in school characteristics, which allows for better control for relevant school 
characteristics then would have been possible with data on a single educational 
system.
One important disadvantage of the PISA 2000 database is its cross-sectional 
nature: the measurement of the pupil’s abilities resembles a “snapshot” of their  
situation at the time. We know nothing about their further development, nor of 
their previous experiences and achievement in education. It is generally assumed 
that a longitudinal measure of educational results with regard to school 
characteristics is superior to cross-sectional observation, because longitudinal 
data allow for better control of unmeasured characteristics and (self)selection. 
Unfortunately, longitudinal cross-national data are not available at this moment 
and are not likely to become available in the next future. Moreover, we know 
from the history of effective schools research that although the effectiveness of 
non-public schools is usually lower in longitudinal research then in cross-
sectional research, the direction of the results is the same in both types of data 
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(compare for example the results of Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) to the 
longitudinal results of Coleman and Hoffer (1987)). Therefore, we think that an 
analysis of these exceptional cross-sectional data is interesting from a scientific 
point of view.
School & Countries
The PISA data distinguishes between different types of schools in a way that 
resembles our distinction as described earlier. The schools are classified as either 
public or private solely according to whether a public agency or a private entity 
has the ultimate power to make decisions concerning the institution ’s affairs. An 
institution is classified as public if it is (1) controlled and managed directly by a 
public education authority or agency or, (2) is controlled and managed either by a 
government agency directly or by a governing body (Council, Committee etc.), 
most of whose members are appointed by a public authority or elected by public 
franchise. In contrast, an institution is classified as private if it is controlled and 
managed by a nongovernmental organization (for example a Church, Trade Union 
or business enterprise), or if its Governing Board consists mostly of members not 
selected by a public agency. The terms “government-dependent” and 
“independent” refer only to the degree of a private school’s dependence on 
funding from government sources; they do not refer to the degree of government 
direction or regulation. A government-dependent private school is one that 
receives more than 50 per cent of its core funding from government agencies. An 
independent private school is one that receives less than 50 per cent of its core 
funding from government agencies. “Core funding” refers to the funds that 
support the basic educational services of the schools. It does not include funds 
provided specifically for research projects, payments for services purchased or 
contracted by private organizations, or fees and subsidies received for ancillary 
services, such as lodging and meals.
The countries we have selected are, in alphabetical order, Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,  
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the USA. These countries have enough absolute numbers of pupils 
with valid reading and math scores attending a form of private school in the PISA 
data for reliable estimates of effectiveness to be made (see table 1) 3. We did not 
select Latin-American and Asian countries, although there sometimes exist 
important non-public sectors (like in Brazil or South-Korea), because of the 
different stage of their social and economic development and their different 
educational traditions. Neither did we select the countries from the former Soviet 
Union (like Russia or the Baltic states) because their societies and their 
educational systems underwent mayor transformations after the breakdown of the 
Soviet communist regime in ‘90s. Our selection is thus restricted to ‘first world’ 
countries which have more or less a common historical and educational 
background, in order to avoid any possible disturbance by a lack of equivalence 
of the characteristics of students, parents and schools due to mayor societal 
transformations or to different stages of development.
We have restricted ourselves in this analysis to those indicators of social 
background that were prominent in the school effectiveness research. The 
literature on the possible causes of effectiveness differences between schools is 
extensive. Although we cannot review this complete literature, we draw on the 
most recent overviews (Sammons, Hillman & Mortimore, 1995; Scheerens & 
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Bosker 1997; Teddlie & Reynolds 2000). This literature distinguishes usually 
three groups of relevant factors: student characteristics and school composition; 
conditions for teaching, learning and school administration; school climate. We 
use the same groups of relevant factors, selecting only those variables that were 
significant in earlier analysis of the effectiveness of private and public schools 
by Dronkers & Robert (2003). Moreover we don’t use those indicators that refer 
to behavior of parents and pupils, because it might be possible that they are a 
consequence of scholastic results, in stead of the cause or effect of 
(self)selection. The use of these variables might flaw the conclusions on the 
causal relations between these variables (Dronkers & Robert, 2003; Sørensen & 
Morgan, 2000).
About here table 1
Data preparation
We use the unweighted data, because we are interested in the ‘quasi-
experimental’ effect that being a pupil in a private or public school has on 
educational results. From this perspective, each country is an ‘experimental’ 
case, which should not be reweighed because of its population size. We are not 
interested in the average difference in educational outcomes of pupils in private 
and public schools in these 19 countries, but in the testing of our hypotheses.  
Such a reweighing with real pupil population sizes for each country would 
produce an unbalanced result, in which countries with the highest pupil 
populations (and thus with certain types of public and private schools) would 
dominate the results, while countries with small pupil populations (and thus with 
certain types of public and private schools) would have a lesser effect on the 
outcomes. An analysis with reweighed data would, therefore, produce invalid 
estimates of the effectiveness of the various public and private schools. For this 
reason, the analysis sticks to the original number of cases, with some corrections 
for very small schools (see below). Fortunately, the sample-size in the various 
countries did not vary too much, allowing us to treat countries under more or less 
equal ‘experimental’ conditions, and without deleting cases. We experimented 
with weighting the data with the country-specific weights, adjusting for internal 
sample design and the non-response per country. This weighting with the sample 
design weights per country produced substantially the same results for the 
differences between public and private schools. For this reason, our analysis 
sticks to the original umber of cases, with a correction for schools with few 
pupils with both a reading and mathematical score. Fortunately,  the sample-size 
of most countries4 doesn’t not vary too much (around the 2000), allowing us to 
treat countries under more or less equal ‘experimental’ conditions 5.
In addition to the selection of countries, we also follow a selection procedure 
with respect to schools and pupils, and include only those pupils for whom the 
basic information on gender, school grade, valid score of achievement (the 
dependent variables), on type of school as described above, location of school, 
and family type was available. In the case of the other independent variables, if 
missing cases occurred in the data, these were replaced by the mean value of the 
variable6. We deleted also all schools with less than 11 pupils who participated in 
the study, because too many schools with very low numbers of pupils could 
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jeopardize the reliable estimation of the effectiveness of these schools by 
outlying scores of schools based on few pupils. The PISA data had a large 
number of schools with less than 11 students with a valid score on both the 
reading and the math tests, because of the random samples of students completing 
the mathematical assessments. We selected only those schools with more than 10 
pupils with valid scores on both dependent variables. We prefer to have the same 
sample size for the analogous analyses with the valid reading and math score, in 
order to avoid possible differences in outcome which might be caused by sample 
size differences. This deletion of schools with less than 11 pupils with valid 
reading and math scores may lead to a bias towards sectors with larger schools 7, 
but we prefer this bias to the possibility of having unclear differences between 
the estimates of school effects for reading and math due to a different data set.
Dependent variables
For this analysis, we decided to use two of the three possible dependent variables 
on pupils’ performance. The survey contained measures on pupils’ reading, 
mathematics and science abilities; we will use the reading and the mathematics 
scales as dependent variables in the analysis in order to have one measure which 
is of a more cultural character, and one measure which is of a more cognitive 
character. The reading scale gives information on the reading proficiency of 
pupils, which is based on retrieving information from text, interpreting text, and 
reflecting on a text or evaluating it, based on numerous tasks. The mathematics 
scale aims to measure the ability of pupils with respect to interpreting and 
translating problems into a mathematical context, using mathematical knowledge 
to solve problems, and interpreting and communicating their results, again based 
on various tasks. Both performance measures were constructed by applying 
weighted maximum likelihood estimates (see Warm 1985) and were translated 
into scales with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.
In both cases, each student did only a part of the test. However, because the 
different parts of the test were overlapping, it is possible to calibrate the scores 
on a latent scale using item-response methods. This results in the end in a good 
measure of student’s abilities in the different domains (OECD 2002a, 2002b). We 
restrict ourselves to mathematics and reading scores and didn’t use the science 
score, because of the large overlap between science and mathematics score, while 
one could argue that reading and mathematics are already covering the two 
different subject domains of teaching.
Sociological and demographic characteristics of pupils and parents
 Most of the independent variables used to predict pupils’ achievement are 
combined indices, developed by PISA. These were also constructed by applying 
weighted maximum likelihood estimates (see Warm 1985) and were standardized 
in such a way as to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 at the 
international level of all countries. We give below the reliability of these scales 
(α) as given by PISA as the mean for all OECD countries. The first set of 
independent variables involves pupils’ as well as their parents’ social and 
demographic characteristics. We will differentiate between males and females in 
the analysis. Despite a slight variation, we will control for school grade  and age 
(measured in months in the data). 8 In keeping with established traditions of social 
mobility and status attainment research, we will include  fathers’ and mothers’  
occupation and education  as indicators of social origin. Occupation is measured 
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in the data by the international socio-economic index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al. 
1992), while education is measured by the ISCED scale (OECD 1999). Further 
information on family background is number of siblings,  as well as family  
structure which distinguishes between nuclear families, single parent families 
and other family constructions (for a separate analysis of the different effects of 
various family forms on scholastic results in these 19 comparable countries, see 
Garib, Martin & Dronkers, 2003). The cultural climate of the family is expected 
to be an important factor of pupils’ performance. In this regard, the PISA survey 
provides information on how frequently parents discuss political and social 
issues, books, films, and television-programs with their offspring. PISA has 
combined these individual items into an index labeled Parents’ academic interest  
(α=0.55). The PISA index on Family cultural possession  (α=0.59) is based on 
having classical literature, books of poetry, works of art at home. In addition to 
cultural possessions, financial capital can also be of importance for educational 
outcomes. As a direct measure of parental income is quite unreliable given that it  
is the pupils in the school who report on it, a Family wealth  index has been 
constructed based on the presence of dishwasher, television, cellular phone, 
motor car, computer, and a link to the internet at home. Since the research aims 
to explore the predictors of pupils’ performance, we need to control for pupils’ 
educational circumstances at home.
School composition
Since the intention of this analysis is to compare pupils’ performance in different 
kind of public and private schools, we must control for the social composition of 
the school population in order to avoid biased measuring in evaluating the 
effectiveness of these types of schools. In order to achieve this goal, we compute 
three aggregated variables from individual pupils’ characteristics: the  school  
average of father’s occupational status  (ISEI), the school average of family’s  
wealth and the school average of parents’ academic interest . These three 
aggregated indices of school compositions cover the three most important 
dimensions of inequality in school composition (financial; occupation; cultural).  
Adding more aggregated indices does not change our results. The next indicator 
of school composition is the proportion of girls  in the school. Finally a series of 
variables indicates the place of residence  for the pupil ranging from small 
settlements (inhabitants less than 3000) up to capital city, is included in the 
analysis.
Teaching and learning conditions
Indicators for the teaching and learning conditions in schools are also considered 
as variables in the analysis of differences in effectiveness. The first simple 
indicator measure the time in terms of number of minutes spent each week at  
school reading and in mathematics classes by the pupil. This information is given 
by the pupil. The other information on teaching and learning conditions was 
provided by school principals. The first indicator is school size,  measured by the 
number of pupils in the school. Principals were also asked to report on the 
number of teaching weeks per year, the number of class periods per week, and the 
number of teaching minutes per class; the variable Hours of schooling per year 
summarizes this information. The availability of “human capital” in the school is 
another factor which may affect pupils’ performance. We use two “rough” 
indicators to measure conditions in the school in this respect, and this is the 
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School size (number of pupils) and  pupil/teacher ratio , where the total number of 
pupils is divided by the total number of teachers in the school. The Schools’  
instructional resources score (α=0.85) is based on the principals’ reports on the 
availability or lack of teaching materials, multi-media resources, science 
laboratory equipment and facilities for fine art education.
School climate
School climate represents a final set of school related variables which can 
influence pupil performance and thus explain differences in effectiveness. The 
PISA survey asked school principals to express their general perceptions of both 
teacher-related and pupil-related factors affecting the school climate. Teacher 
related factors include high or low expectations of the teachers towards their 
pupils, teacher absenteeism, frequency of changes in the teaching staff, teachers’ 
encouragement of pupils to achieve better, or strictness with the pupils. Pupil 
related factors include pupil absenteeism, disruption of or skipping of classes, 
lack of respect for teachers, use of alcohol or drugs, and the intimidation of other 
pupils. These indicators are combined into two indices labeled Teacher 
misbehavior (α=0.83) and Pupil misbehavior (α=0.81). Finally, the Teacher 
morale index  (α =0.79) expresses principals’ perceptions of teachers’ morale, 
enthusiasm, on how much they take pride in the school and how much they value 
academic achievement.
Method
For the analysis of the data we use multilevel analysis (MlwiN 1.1, Rabash et al.  
2000), which is generally considered as the best method to asses school effect 
differences (Scheerens & Bosker, 1997) because this method is most able to 
handle the nested structure of the data. As a result of the use of latent scale 
scores (see above) we have an analysis with four levels: At the lowest level we 
have the reading weighted likelihood estimates as the dependent variable, and the 
standard deviation of the error of this estimate. The variance at the lowest level 
is fixed at 1.00. This procedure results in a measurement model of the next level 
of the students (see Hox, 2002). It gives a more reliable estimation of the true 
score of the students, because the model takes the measured error into account.  
The next levels are the individual level with the characteristics of pupils and 
parents as control variables, the school level with school composition, school 
type and other school characteristics as explanatory variables, and the country 
level with no specific variables.
The plan of the analyses is as follows. We start with a basic model (1) that 
includes the test score for the reading or mathematics test as the dependent 
variable, and background characteristics of pupils and parents as independent 
variables, as well as school type. In the second step we ask whether the effects of 
social background vary on the school level; a significant variance of these 
variables on the school level would suggest an interaction between school 
characteristics and individual characteristics. The next step is to check whether 
the variance of background variables (if any) can be related to school type, by 
constructing and adding interaction variables with those background variables 
and school type. Model 2 then contains the interaction variables that proved to be 
significant, in addition to the variables of model 1. We expand the model further 
by adding school level variables of social composition and school location 
(model 3), teaching and learning conditions (model 4) and eventually school 
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climate (model 5). We conclude the analyses with a short note on a possible 
extension of the analyses. We try to avoid too many descriptive results, except 
for the most important variables. Readers interested in more extensive 
descriptions of the data are referred to Dronkers and Robert (2003).
Results
Descriptive analysis
Table 2 gives the averages of the dependent and the most important independent 
variables, separately per school type. The differences in the averages between 
public and private schools are clear and significant. Pupils on private 
independent schools have higher scores on language and mathematics, but have 
also a better social background (higher educated parents; higher parental 
occupational status; more parental academic interest; more cultural passions; 
higher family wealth). This is also true for pupils of private government-
dependent schools, but their differences with pupils at public schools are smaller.  
Moreover, pupils of private government-dependent schools are lower on two 
points than pupils from other schools: parental academic interest and cultural 
possessions. The school composition of the private independent schools is far 
better that that of the public schools on the three indicators: average occupational 
status of fathers; average material wealth of families; average cultural 
possessions. For private government-dependent schools this is mainly the case for 
average occupational status, but the average cultural possessions by the families 
is lower. The hours of schooling per year are higher in private schools than in 
public schools, but the teaching conditions on private schools are not always 
more favorable than on public schools. The pupil/staff ration and the amount of 
instructional resources are worse on private schools compared to public ones. 
Finally is the level of misbehavior of teachers and pupils on private schools 
lower than on public schools and the teacher morale higher.
About here table 2
 
Public and private schools differ on an important number of aspects and any 
conclusion based on table 2 is impropriate and misleading. But it is also clear 
that private independent and private government-dependent schools also differ on 
a number of points and that it is therefore wrong to tread them as one 
homogonous group.
Multi-level analyses
Model 1: effects of school type and social background The first columns of tables 
3a and 3b show the starting model with school type (public schools are the 
reference category) and the social background variables as independent variables.  
The positive effects of the dichotomous variables private independent and private 
government-dependent schools show that pupils on these schools do better in 
mathematics and reading than pupils of public schools with a comparable social 
background. This is especially true for pupils at private independent schools. 
Given the overall standard deviations of reading of 99.5 and mathematics of 96.2 
(table 2), the advantage of pupils at private independent schools after controlling 
for social background variables is 29% (reading 9) and 23% (mathematics 10) of the 
overall standard deviation. The analogous relative advantages of pupils at private 
dependent schools are 15% and 12%. 11 These are no trivial differences between 
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the controlled scores of private and public schools. The variables of social 
background have nearly all an effect in the same direction: a better social 
background improves the scholastic achievement on comparable school types. 
The only exception is the variable ‘family wealth’, which has no significant 
effect on the mathematic score (the standard error is lager than the half of the 
coefficient) and has even a negative effect on the score of the reading test. This 
suggests that family wealth has at the most an effect via other social background 
variables. Finally the tables show the variances of the dependent variables at the 
individual level, the school level and the country level. The largest variance is at 
the individual level, followed by the school level and the country level.
About here tables 3a & 3b
Random coefficients
Multi-level analysis allows for investigating whether the effect of an independent 
variable of a lower level varies significantly between units of a higher level; in 
this case whether the effects of variables of the individual level (social 
background) vary between schools. Variance in the effects of social background 
variables might indicate an interaction-effect between social background and 
school characteristics. Tables 4a and 4b show for each of the social background 
variables the ‘fixed coefficient’ (that is the average effect over all schools) and 
the variance in this effect (‘random coefficient’) between schools. The 
significance of the random effect is tested by a χ2 – test on the difference in 
deviance as compared to the model without random effects. The random effects 
are always separately estimated, using model 1.
In the model with mathematics as dependent variable the effects of mothers’  
fathers’ occupational status, fathers’ educational level, the number of siblings, 
family wealth, cultural possessions and other family form are significantly 
different between schools.  For reading all social background variables, except 
family form “single parent”, do have significant variances at the school level.  
Therefore for these variables it is worthwhile to see whether these differences in 
effect between schools are related with school type.
About here tables 4a & 4b
Model 2: Interaction-effects
In order to investigate whether the differences in effects of social background 
variables can be explained by the distinction between the three school types, we 
construct the interaction effects between those social background variables, 
which have a significant variance at the school level and the dichotomous school 
type variables. We estimate these interaction effects by adding them separately 
(two per social background variable) to model 1. To save space we refer to these 
analyses to an appendix which is available on demand and we continue here with 
the discussion of model 2, which is model 1 with all significant interaction effect 
included.
The effects of cultural possessions and fathers’ occupational status are 
significantly different between the three school types for mathematics. In order to 
ease the interpretations of these effects, we have centered the variables fathers’ 
occupational status (for mathematics) and the number of sibling (for reading) on 
their averages (this was already done for cultural possessions; see section 
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‘sociological and demographic characteristics of pupils and parents). As the 
consequence of this centration the main effects of private independent and private 
government-dependent schools now indicate the effects of these school types for 
the pupil with the average family cultural possession, with an average number of 
siblings and with a father with an average occupational status. The main-effects 
of cultural possession, fathers’ occupational status and number of siblings now 
indicate the effects for pupils at public schools.
The interaction-effect of cultural possession on private dependent is negative,  
which means that few cultural possessions are less of a disadvantage at private 
dependent school. This confirms hypothesis 1. For pupils on public schools the 
effect of cultural possessions is 5.01; for pupils on private dependent school it is  
2.76 (= 5.01-2.25). The interaction-effect between private independent and 
cultural possession is positive but just not significant: the effect of cultural 
possession is not significantly larger on private independent schools than on 
public schools.
The effect of fathers’ occupational status differs significantly between private 
independent and public schools, but not between the latter and private 
government-dependent schools. The interaction-effect between fathers’ 
occupational status and private independent is negative, and also a little larger 
than the positive main effect. This means that the effect of fathers’ occupational 
status is positive on public and private government-dependent schools (0.367), 
but nearly zero and even slightly negative on private independent schools (0.367-
0.378 = -0.011), in contradiction with hypothesis 2.
The result that the interaction-effects between the other social background 
variables and school type are not significant means that the effects of these 
background variables differ significantly between schools but not between the 
tree school types we are interested in right now. These differences might be 
explained by other school characteristics.
If we take reading as dependent variable, significant interaction-effects exist  
between school type and cultural possession, and with number of siblings. Just 
like with mathematics, there is a negative interaction-effect between cultural 
possessions and private government-dependent schools (pupils with few cultural 
possessions in their families do better on private government-dependent schools 
than on public schools, corresponding with hypothesis 1), and its strength has 
about the same magnitude. There is again a positive interaction effect with 
private independent, although smaller and also not significant.
In contradiction to the model with mathematics as dependent variable, not 
fathers’ occupational status but number of siblings has a significant interaction-
effect with private independent schools. This interaction-effect is positive and 
larger than the main effect: while the effect of more siblings is negative on public 
schools, it is positive on private independent schools: pupils with more siblings 
do relatively better on the latter schools. This contradicts hypothesis 2. The 
interaction-effect with private government-dependent is positive but not 
significant: private government-dependent schools don’t differ significantly from 
public schools in their effect of the number of siblings.
Finally the tables 3 also show the variance per level and the variance in the 
main effects of the two social background variables (fathers occupation; cultural 
possession) on the school level (the lowest rows). If we compare the variance of 
the effects on the school level of table 3 with that of table 4, we see that for 
mathematics the variance of the effect of cultural possession declines strongly 
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(from 19,6 (table 4a) to 13,8 (model 2 of table 3a) by including the interaction-
term, while that of the effect of fathers’ occupational status only decreases 
slightly (from 0,15 to 0,12). Also for reading the variance of the effect of cultural  
possession becomes clearly smaller, but that of number of siblings decreases less.  
This shows that the differences in effects between schools can only be attributed 
partly to school type. There remains in all cases still some significant variance at 
the school level: there are obliviously still differences between schools regarding 
the effects of social background, which are not related with school type.
Model 3: school composition and urbanization level.
 In this and the next sections we try to explain the found significant interaction-
effects between social background and school type by adding other school 
characteristics to model 2. If the interaction-effects become smaller by this 
addition or even become insignificant, they can be explained by these school 
characteristics, but not or less by school type. In model 3 we start with this 
procedure by controlling for the various aspects of social and gender school 
composition and for the urbanization level of the municipality of the school. All 
additional variables in this model 3 are thus variables at the school level. In order 
to keep the results from various models easily comparable and because our 
hypotheses refer to the interactions between school types, we maintain also the 
insignificant interaction-effects from model 2 in the following models.
Tables 3a and 3b show that school composition, especially the cultural aspect 
of social background, has strong effects on scholastic achievement. Also a lower 
urbanization level improves these achievements, and in the case of reading the 
percentage female pupils does the same. The main effect of private independent 
school becomes negative, which means that given the (good) social composition 
of these private independent schools, pupils of these schools achieve less 
relatively.  The main effect of private independent is in both cases no longer 
significant.
With regard to the interaction-effects, their magnitudes are hardly changed by 
controlling for school composition and urbanization level, and in most cases 
become even slightly larger: thus the interaction-effects cannot be explained by 
school composition or urbanization level. It is however useful to discuss the 
relation between main effects and interaction-effects. Although the effect of 
private independent for mathematics is negative for the average pupil, the 
negative interaction-effect with fathers’ occupational status makes that the effect 
of this school type becomes slightly positive for pupils with a father with a very 
low occupational status. But the positive effect of fathers’ occupational status on 
public and private government-dependent schools is negative on private 
independent schools. For reading, the positive interaction-effect of the number of 
siblings has comparable consequences: for more than two siblings the effect of 
private independent becomes positive, because the negative effect of number of 
siblings becomes slightly positive at private independent schools.
It also becomes clear that, although the positive effect of private government-
dependent is not longer significant in both dependent variables, there is still a 
significant interaction-effect with cultural possessions: private government-
dependent schools are not better or worse for the average pupil, but they are 
relatively better for pupils with few cultural possessions in their families and 
worse for those with many cultural possessions. Finally, we see that, for both 
dependent variables, the variance at the school level has strongly declined 
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compared to the previous models without school composition. This suggests that 
these school characteristics are for a large part responsible for the differences in 
scholastic achievement between schools. The variance of the three social 
background variables at the school level is hardly changed compared with the 
previous models.
Model 4: teaching and learning conditions
While in the previous sections we have focused on the pupils’ characteristics, the 
analyses with model 4 are extended by characteristics of the teaching processes 
in schools. Nearly all additional variables of this model are variables measured at  
the school level, with the number of minutes spent each week at school reading 
and in mathematics classes by the pupil (learning time). For mathematics learning 
time and school size have a positive effect on achievement, while the pupil/staff 
ratio and ( remarkably) the amount of schools’ instructional resources have a 
negative effect. The total number of schooling per year has no significant effect.  
For reading only the pupil/staff ratio and the amount of schools’ instructional 
resources have significant effects, in the same direction as for mathematics.  
Although these conditions for teaching and learning clearly have effects on 
scholastic achievement, there is hardly any change in the magnitude or direction 
of the interaction-effects. Also the main effects are almost the same as in model 
3, just as the variance of these effects. Therefore, the interaction-effects between 
social background and school type cannot be explained by these school 
characteristics. The non-existence of a substantial decline of the variance at 
school level of the effects of cultural possession, fathers’ occupational status and 
number of siblings confirms this conclusion.
Model 5: school climate
In the last extension of our analyses we add the characteristics of the school 
climate: the degree of misbehavior of teachers and pupils and the teachers’ 
morale. The thesis of Coleman and Hoffer assumes that the relatively better 
scholastic achievement of lower social class pupils at private government-
dependent schools is (among other things) caused by the functional community 
around these schools which make it possible to maintain a better school climate.
The last columns of tables 2a and 2b show that specially the degree of 
misbehavior by the pupils has a negative effect on scholastic achievement (the 
same magnitude for both independent variables), while the teachers’ morale has a 
small but significant and positive effect. Remarkably teachers’ misbehavior has a 
positive effect on both dependent variables. But again we don’t see any change 
for the interaction-effects or the variance in the effects of social background. 
Thus also differences in school climate cannot explain the difference of the 
effects of social background variables between the three school types. However 
there is some further decline of the main effect of private government-dependent 
school for mathematics, which was already no longer significant in the previous 
model.
Additional analyses: interactions with composition variables.
 In this section we discuss briefly a related possible explanation of the found 
significant interaction-effects between social background and school type: The 
possibility that the differences in the effect of social background is caused  by an 
effect of school composition on the effect of social background on scholastic 
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achievement. Differences in the effects of social background per school type 
could be explained by differences between schools in relation to the effects of 
school composition on the effect of social background. In the latter case it is the 
combinations between pupils’ characteristics and school composition, and not the 
three school types, which produce the differences in effectiveness between public 
and private schools. In order to test this alternative hypothesis, we add to model 
5 interaction-effects between the relevant aspect of social background (cultural 
possession, fathers’ occupational status, number of siblings) and the school 
averages on these variables. From these analyses, for which we refer to the 
appendix which is available on demand, it is clear that only for reading the 
interaction-effect between number of sibling and private government-dependent 
school becomes slightly smaller (one point); in the other interaction-effects 
nothing changed by this addition. Also this alternative hypothesis on interactions 
between background and school composition cannot explain the differences of the 
effect of social background between the three school types. 12
Conclusions and discussion
We have found some, though modest, support for the first hypothesis that states 
that private government-dependent schools are relatively more effective for 
pupils from the lower social strata. Private dependent schools appear to be 
somewhat more effective for pupils with little cultural capital (as measured by 
the cultural possessions of their parents), even after controlling for differences in 
school composition, learning conditions and school climate. Moreover, it appears 
that this interaction effect can account for the higher effectiveness of private 
dependent schools as found by Dronkers and Robert: private dependent schools 
are not more effective for the average pupil, but only for those with little cultural  
capital.
A few points must be noted however. In the first place the interaction effect we 
found is, although statistically significant, not very large, especially when 
compared with the effects that for example school composition on background 
variables has on school achievement. Second, the majority of the estimated 
possible interaction effects were not significant, which means that public and 
private schools have mostly the same effects for the same kind of pupils and thus 
mostly not favor one kind of pupils above another kind of pupils. This result runs 
against the sometimes popular assumption that private schools favor pupils from 
higher social classes. Third, we found a higher effectiveness of private dependent 
schools for pupils from the lower strata for only one out of ten available 
measures of social background.
On the one hand, this may lead on to question the validity of the various 
measures ass indicators of social background; on the other hand, one may argue 
that for effects of social background on educational outcomes, cultural activities 
would be a more direct measure than for instance occupational status. We think 
however that it is at least justified to state that if there are any differential school 
effects, those will not be in favor of the public schools.
In contrast to the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis, stating that the 
performance of lower class pupils would be worse on private independent 
schools, can clearly be regarded as refuted. Both aspects of social background 
that appear to have different effects on private independent schools as compared 
to public schools (father’s occupational status for math and the number of 
siblings for reading) do so in the opposite direction: pupils that score low on 
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these two measures for social background appear to perform better on private 
independent schools. But again it must be stressed that these effects are rather 
small, and only exist for one out of ten indicators for social background (per 
dependent variable). Moreover, while in the case of private government-
dependent schools the interaction effect of cultural capital was consistent 
between the mathematics and reading test scores, in this case the interaction 
effects involve different variables for the two test scores.
With some moderate support for the first hypothesis and a clear refutation of 
the second hypothesis it seems hard to defend Coleman and Hoffer’s theory of 
differential school effects and social capital. Moreover, the fact that differences 
in school climate do not help to explain the apparent differential effects does not 
favor their theory: school climate was supposed to act as an intermediate variable 
between the existence of a functional community and better school achievement 
of low social class pupils. This means that while there is evidence that some 
effects predicted by the theory do indeed occur, the mechanisms that are 
supposed to be responsible for these effects could not be identified.
We should however point out that our test of the Coleman-Hoffer thesis has in 
some respects been rather indirect. The original theory, for one thing, aimed at 
explaining differences between catholic schools and public schools, while we 
extended its predictions to involve private-dependent schools in general (because 
the PISA data do not contain a measure for religious affiliation of the school). 
Moreover, the number of indicators with regard to the mechanisms of functional 
communities was limited to three (the measure for school climate). A defense of 
the theory in this fashion could state that the differential effects we found can be 
explained by other, now unmeasured characteristics of functional communities, 
such as a stricter and more focused curriculum.
It is not so easy to provide an explanation for the higher effectiveness of 
private independent schools for pupils from the lower strata, given that it is not 
school composition or teaching conditions. A possible cause of the positive effect 
of the number of siblings at private independent schools could be that family size 
is an ambiguous indicator of social-economic class. If upper class or very 
religious families have more children then the average family, the high 
achievements of the children from these families on private independent schools 
might explain the effects found. Another explanation might be that, given the 
better school climate on private independent schools as compared to public 
schools, these schools do in fact manage to constitute features of functional 
communities that public schools may be lacking (although the effects of these 
functional communities should be operating by other means then school climate 
in that case). This explanation would not only apply to the interaction effect of 
the number of siblings, but also to the effect of father’s occupational status. 
Perhaps the local embeddedness of public schools, that was supposed to create 
functional communities, is not as strong as we assumed, and is the integrating 
effect of deliberate school choice on private independent schools more important 
in this regard. Also, the category of private independent schools might also be 
including some religious schools, which provides another reason to wish for a 
measure of religiousness in future surveys. A third explanation might be that we 
did not control for learning capabilities, insofar as they are not related to social 
origin. It is very well possible that low status families can only send their 
children to private independent schools if these children appear to be especially 
capable, because of the support of grants that are specially designed by the 
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private schools for very bright pupils. Many private independent schools offer 
some kind of grants or bursaries to scholastically very well performing children 
who cannot afford to pay their fees, in order to increase the intellectual level of 
their pupils and to legitimize their elitist function.
It should however be remembered that although low status children tend to 
perform relatively better in private independent schools, the majority of low 
status pupils will not be able to access these schools in the first place because of 
the higher probability of extra fees. The fact that some aspects of social 
background appear to be a smaller handicap at private schools means that schools 
of this type could, ceteris paribus , reduce educational inequality between social 
classes. In practice however, the high degree of (self-)selection of pupils of 
favorable backgrounds will in combination with the positive effects of school 
composition lead to a net increase in educational inequality as related to social 
class. The findings also indicate that statements in debates related to public 
versus private education should be carefully argued, especially if related to the 
emancipatory value of private schools.
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Table 1: Percentages of students and, between parentheses, the absolute 
number of schools by school-sector and country in our final data set
Countries School-sector N of cases
Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public
Austria 6.1% (7) 5.7% (7) 88.2% (107) 1985 (121)
Belgium 0.5% (1) 74.7% (138) 24.8% (49) 3352 (188)
Czech Republic - 4.7% (7) 95.3% (144) 2430 (151) 
Denmark - 21.3% (28) 78.7% (102) 1620 (130)
Finland - 2.8% (4) 97.2% (146) 2629 (150)
France 8.0% (11) 14.2% (21) 77.8% (107) 2170 (139)
Germany - 4.9% (7) 95.1% (143) 2068 (150)
Hungary 0.6% (1) 4.4% (6) 95.0% (133) 2488 (140)
Ireland 2.8% (4) 61.8% (77) 35.4% (48) 2001 (129)
Italy 3.4% (5) 0.6% (1) 96.0% (135) 2420 (141)
Netherlands - 76.1% (62) 23.9% (20) 1164 (85)
New Zealand 4.1% (5) - 95.9% (123) 1748 (128)
Poland 1.8% (2) - 98.2% (110) 1796 (112)
Portugal 1.8% (2) 5.5% (7) 92.7% (120) 2254 (129)
Spain 8.4% (13) 29.2% (46) 62.4% (104) 2963 (163)
Sweden - 3.3% (5) 96.7% (136) 2317 (141)
Switzerland 2.9% (5) 1.8% (3) 95.3% (138) 2358 (146)
United Kingdom 5.0% (14) - 95.0% (284) 4151 (298)
USA 3.6% (3) 1.3% (1) 95.1% (83) 1292 (87)
Total 2.7% (73) 15.9% (420) 81.4% (2232) 43607 (2725)
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Table 2: Means and standard deviations of the dependent and the most 
important independent variables per school type. 
School type Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public Total
Reading 553.5* (91.7)$ 529.9* (94.0)$ 504.3 (99.9) 509.7 (99.5)
Mathematics 546.5* (92.4) 528.0* (92.7)$ 503.8 (96.2) 508.8 (96.2)
Fathers 
occupational 
status 
54.9* (17.3)$ 45.9* (16.3)$ 43.6 (15.4) 44.3 (15.7)
Fathers 
educational level
5.0* (1.2)$ 4.5*(1.4)$ 4.3 (1.3) 4.4 (1.3)
Mothers 
occupational 
status
50.4* (15.4)$ 43.4* (14.7)$ 43.0 (14.5) 43.2 (14.6)
Mothers 
educational level
4.8* (1.3) 4.4* (1.4)$ 4.3 (1.3) 4.3 (1.3)
Number of 
siblings
1.5* (1.1)$ 1.8*(1.3) 1.8 (1.3) 1.8 (1.3)
Parental academic 
interest
0.41* (0.90) -0.09* (1.01)$ 0.02 (0.95) 0.01 (0.97)
Family cultural 
possessions
0.46* (0.89)$ -0.12* (1.00)$ -0.03 (0.99) -0.03 (0.99)
Family wealth 0.55* (0.93) 0.03* (0.82)$ -0.02 (0.95) 0.00 (0.94)
Single parent 
family
0.15 (0.35)$ 0.12 (0.33)$ 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36)
Other family form 0.07 (0.26)$ 0.08 (0.27)$ 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29)
Average Fathers 
occupational 
status
53.9* (8.3)$ 45.9* (7.4)$ 43.6 (7.0) 44.3 (7.3)
Average Family 
wealth
0.55* (0.48)$ 0.03* (0.40)$ -0.02 (0.57) 0.00 (0.55)
Average Family 
cultural 
possessions
0.46* (0.42) -0.12* (0.47)$ -0.04 (0.44) -0.04 (0.45) 
School size: 
number of pupils
666* (357)$ 712* (420)$ 694 (435) 696 (431)
Hours of 
schooling per year
983.9* (151.1)$ 991.1* (109.1)$ 943.4 (138.6) 952.1 (136.0)
Pupil/teacher 
ratio.
13.4* (4.5)$ 13.3* (4.3)$ 12.8 (4.7) 12.9 (4.6)
School 
instructional 
resources
-0.73* (0.87) -0.24* (0.96) -0.08 (0.96) -0.13 (0.97)
Teachers’ 
misbehavior
-0.84* (0.96)$ -0.13* (1.00)$ -0.01 (0.9) -0.05 (0.93)
Pupils’ 
misbehavior
-0.88* (0.96)$ -0.29* (1.04)$ 0.04 (0.89) -0.04 (0.93)
Teacher morale 0.39* (1.03)$ 0.06* (0.89)$ -0.08 (0.95) -0.05 (0.95)
• Significant differences between the averages are compared with that of public schools ( t-
test with unequal variances;  p < 0.05); $ significant differences in standard deviation 
compared with those of public schools Levene’s test; p < 0.05).  Source :  PISA survey. 
2000.
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Table 3a: Coefficients of five hierarchical multilevel-models with the mathematical score 
as dependent variable (standard error between parentheses)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 281.91(19.38) 296.59 (19.38) 219.77 (20.11) 208.07 (20.78) 224.59 (20.71)
Private independent 23.10 (4.36) 24.25 (4.61) -8.69 (4.20) -8.57 (4.22) -10.66 (4.11)
Private dependent 11.14 (2.54) 10.99 (2.54) 2.64 (2.21) 2.58 (2.21) 0.51 (2.15)
Public ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Age -0.94 (0.10) -0.95 (0.10) -0.91 (0.10) -0.91 (0.10) -0.91 (0.10)
Grade 36.25 (0.74) 36.24 (0.74) 35.12 (0.73) 35.03 (0.73) 34.91 (0.73)
Male  15.17 (0.70) 15.20 (0.70) 15.79 (0.71) 15.55 (0.70) 15.56 (0.70)
Mothers’ 
occupational status 0.33 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.31 (0.03) 0.31 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03)
Fathers 
‘occupational status 0.32 (0.03) 0.37 (0.03) 0.28 (0.03) 0.28 (0.03) 0.28 (0.03)
Mothers’ education 2.48 (0.32) 2.50 (0.32) 2.26 (0.32) 2.24 (0.32) 2.20 (0.32)
Fathers’ education 1.64 (0.32) 0.17 (0.32) 1.44 (0.32) 1.43 (0.32) 1.41 (0.32)
Number of sibling -2.22 (0.27) -2.18 (0.27) -1.98 (0.27) -1.94 (0.27) -1.92 (0.27)
Family wealth 0.60 (0.43) 0.58 (0.43) -0.08 (0.44) -0.09 (0.44) -0.07 (0.44)
Parental academic 
interest 4.43 (0.37) 4.42 (0.37) 4.19 (0.36) 4.16 (0.36) 4.18 (0.36)
Family cultural 
possessions 4.74 (0.38) 5.01 (0.42) 4.12 (0.42) 4.06 (0.42) 4.10 (0.42)
Single parent family -7.30 (0.92) -7.36 (0.92) -7.65 (0.92) -7.56 (0.92) -7.43 (0.92)
Other family form -8.78 (1.13) -8.81 (1.13) -8.83 (1.13) -8.79 (1.13) -8.13 (1.13)
Nuclear family ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Private 
indep.*Occupation 
father -0.38 (0.13) -0.39 (0.13) -0.40 (0.13) -0.42 (0.13)
Private 
dep.*Occupation 
father -0.04 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06)
Private 
indep.*Cultural 
possessions 4.81 (2.44) 3.69 (2.42) 3.53 (2.41) 3.33 (2.41)
Private dep.* 
Cultural possessions -2.25 (0.97) -2.47 (0.97) -2.48 (0.96) -2.64 (0.96)
Average 
occupational status 
father 1.61 (0.12) 1.55 (0.12) 1.37 (0.12)
Average family 
wealth 11.49 (2.21) 11.25 (2.20) 9.78 (2.15)
Average cultural 
possession 23.60 (2.08) 23.86 (2.06) 20.21 (2.02)
Town >1.000000 ref. ref. ref.
Town > 15.000 12.43 (2.10) 12.91 (2.08) 11.28 (2.02)
Village 19.41 (2.26) 20.30 (2.26) 17.25 (2.21)
% girl 0.62 (3.20) 1.79 (3.17) -0.91 (3.09)
Learning time 
mathematics 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
School size*100 0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.2)
Hours of schooling 
per year*100 0.5 (0.5) 0.4 (0.5)
Pupil/teacher ratio -0.38 (0.16) -0.53 (0.16)
Instructional 
resources -1.89 (0.65) -0.57 (0.66)
Misbehavior 
teachers 3.65 (0.84)
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Misbehavior pupils -10.64 (0.83)
Morale teachers 1.48 (0.72)
Variances 
individual 2493.40 (29.05) 2451.75 (30.37) 2446.66 (30.28) 2438.35 (30.22) 2439.43 (30.21)
Variances school 1034.03 (35.51) 1024.37 (35.48) 691.82 (26.43) 675.80 (25.97) 615.61 (24.33)
Variances country 806.43 (264.90) 805.63 (264.50) 755.02 (247.24) 823.75 (269.55) 821.72 (268.82)
Variances occ. 
father school level 0.12 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) 0.10 (0.04)
Variances cult. poss. 
school level 13.82 (9.13) 14.83 (9.03) 14.21 (8.99) 14.64 (8.97)
 -2*log likelihood 497173.3 497111 496247 496113 495936
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Table 3b: Coefficients of five hierarchical multilevel-models with the reading score as 
dependent variable (standard error between parentheses)
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 276.68 (20.26) 269.86 (20.22) 185.09 (21.08) 180.64 (21.90) 199.39 (21.86)
Private independent 28.56 (5.04) 28.52 (5.19) -11.26 (4.63) -12.17 (4.67) -14.75 (4.55)
Private dependent 15.21 (2.93) 15.03 (2.93) 4.46 (2.50) 4.70 (2.52) 2.25 (2.83)
Public ref ref. ref. ref. ref.
Age -0.97 (0.11) -0.97 (0.11) -0.94 (0.11) -0.94 (0.11) -0.94 (0.11)
Grade 42.08 (0.77) 42.04 (0.77) 40.88 (0.76) 40.83 (0.76) 40.74 (0.75)
Male -21.39 (0.74) -21.43 (0.74) -20.48 (0.74) -20.48 (0.74) -20.47 (0.74)
Mothers’ 
occupational status 0.33 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03)
Fathers 
‘occupational status 0.46 (0.03) 0.46 (0.03) 0.38 (0.03) 0.38 (0.03) 0.39 (0.03)
Mothers’ education 2.79 (0.33) 2.79 (0.33) 2.56 (0.33) 2.56 (0.33) 2.52 (0.33)
Fathers’ education 1.13 (0.34) 1.14 (0.34) 0.92 (0.33) 0.92 (0.33) 0.91 (0.33)
Number of sibling -4.03 (0.28) -4.28 (0.33) -4.04 (0.33) -4.04 (0.33) -4.04 (0.33)
Family wealth -2.45 (0.46) -2.47 (0.46) -3.07 (0.46) -3.07 (0.46) -3.05 (0.46)
Parental academic 
interest 8.68 (0.38) 8.71 (0.38) 8.47 (0.38) 8.46 (0.38) 8.47 (0.38)
Family cultural 
possessions 7.20 (0.40) 7.50 (0.45) 6.60 (0.45) 6.59 (0.45) 6.64 (0.45)
Single parent family -8.73 (0.97) -8.68 (0.97) -9.07 (0.96) -9.05 (0.96) -8.91 (0.96)
Other family form -8.36 (1.19) -8.42 (1.19) -8.51 (1.19) -8.49 (1.19) -8.33 (1.19)
Nuclear family ref. ref. ref ref. ref.
Private 
indep.*Number 
siblings 6.06 (1.97) 5.72 (1.96) 5.69 (1.96) 5.52 (1.95)
Private 
dep.*Number 
siblings 1.24 (0.81) 1.02 (0.81) 1.03 (0.81) 1.13 (0.81)
Private 
indep.*Cultural 
possessions 2.38 (2.61) 1.35 (2.58) 1.26 (2.58) 1.05 (2.57)
Private dep.* 
Cultural possessions -2.43 (1.04) -2.69 (1.03) -2.69 (1.03) -2.86 (1.03)
Average 
occupational status 
father 1.79 (0.14) 1.78 (0.14) 1.56 (0.14)
Average family 
wealth 11.82 (2.49) 11.43 (2.49) 9.75 (2.43)
Average cultural 
possession 30.92 (2.35) 31.00 (2.35) 26.90 (2.30)
Town >1.000000 ref. ref. ref.
Town > 15.000 12.15 (2.38) 12.63 (2.37) 10.81 (2.31)
Village 17.61 (2.56) 18.60 (2.58) 15.19 (2.52)
% girl 12.05 (3.62) 11.98 (3.61) 8.79 (3.51)
Learning time 
reading 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
School size*100 0.3 (0.2) 0.4 (0.2)
Hours of schooling 
per year*100 0.6 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5)
Pupil/teacher ratio -0.38 (0.18) -0.57 (0.18)
Instructional 
resources -2.83 (0.74) -1.27 (0.75)
Misbehavior 
teachers 3.88 (0.96)
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Misbehavior pupils -11.96 (0.94)
Morale teachers 1.73 (0.82)
Variances 
individual 3638.45 (32.61) 3586.27 (33.96) 3580.49 (33.88) 3580.01 (33.88) 3579.63 (33.86)
Variances school 1439.63 (47.33) 1429.15 (47.29) 935.52 (33.85) 924.62 (33.56) 848.44 (31.49)
Variances country 721.55 (238.44) 713.10 (235.58) 637.88 (210.10) 675.53 (222.15) 710.97 (233.41)
Variances number 
siblings school level 16.49 (5.51) 16.76 (5.46) 16.87 (5.46) 16.74 (5.44)
Variances cult. 
poss. school level 32.88 (10.33) 30.94 (10.14) 30.82 (10.13) 30.53 (10.10)
 -2*log likelihood 500554.60 500502.60 499545.60 499519.80 499345.70
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Table 4a: Random coefficients and their variances of social background characteristics at 
the school level; variances each separately estimated in model 1 with mathematical score 
as dependent variable (standard error between parentheses)
Variable Fixed CoefficientVariances Difference Deviance p (one-sided)*
Mothers occupational status 0.34 (0.03) 0.07 (0.04) 4.8 0.045
Fathers occupational status 0.35 (0.03) 0.15 (0.04) 38.7 0.000
Mothers education 2.51 (0.32) 8.61 (5.03) 4.5 0.052
Fathers education 1.67 (0.33) 11.89 (5.01) 7.4 0.012
Number of siblings -2.19 (0.28) 10.24 (4.85) 7.9 0.019
Family wealth 0.67 (0.44) 25.81 (11.22) 47.5 0.000
Parental academic interest 4.45 (0.37) 15.57 (8.77) 3.5 0.087
Family cultural possession 4.75 (0.39) 19.60 (8.97) 6 0.025
Single parent family -7.30 (0.92) 0.00 (0.00) 0 - 
Other family form -9.04 (1.17) 184.42 (78.81) 12.6 0.000
* χ2-test with df = 2
Table 4b: Random coefficients and their variances of social background characteristics at 
the school level; variances each separately estimated in model 1 with reading score as 
dependent variable (standard error between parentheses)
Variable Fixed Coefficient Variances Deviance Difference p (one-sided)*
Mothers occupational status 0.33 (0.03) 0.11 (0.04) 7.1 0.014
Fathers occupational status 0.48 (0.03) 0.10 (0.04) 36.1 0.000
Mothers education 2.81 (0.34) 14.37 (5.78) 6.7 0.017
Fathers education 1.17 (0.34) 13.24 (5.58) 5.5 0.031
Number of siblings -3.95 (0.30) 17.62 (5.56) 13.7 0.000
Family wealth -2.55 (0.47) 42.34 (13.02) 30.1 0.000
Parental academic interest 8.81 (0.42) 66.11 (11.21) 47 0.000
Family cultural possession 7.18 (0.41) 33.54 (10.36) 20 0.000
Single parent family -8.74 (0.99) 79.17 (60.69) 1.4 0.248
Other family form -8.65 (1.27) 385.30 (93.90) 27.3 0.000
* χ2-test with df = 2
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1 Paper presented at the European Research Conference on ‘European Society or European Societies? Causes and 
Consequences of Low Education in Contemporary Europe’. Granada, Spain, 18-23 September 2004. An earlier version 
was a keynote speech at the meeting of the ISA Research Committee Sociology of Education ‘Education, Participation 
& Globalisation’ in Prague, Czech Republic, 20-22 May, 2004. Direct all correspondence to the second author: 
European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini, 9. 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy. E-mail: 
jaap.dronkers@iue.it. The address of the first author is: Department of Sociology, University of Utrecht, Heidelberglaan 
2, 3584 CS, Utrecht, the Netherlands. E-mail: r.corten@fss.uu.nl. 
2 www.pisa.oecd.org/pisa/
3 The Canadian data did not allow for a public - private distinction. 
4 Only the Netherlands has a substantial lower number of respondents due to a very high non-response and the United 
Kingdom has a substantial higher number of respondents in order to allow for the possibility to differentiate between its 
three educational systems (England/Wales; Scotland; North-Ireland).
5 Moreover, experiments with the country specific weights learn that this weighting hardly effects the outcome 
differences between the two types private schools and public schools. The comparison between the weighted and 
unweighted results can be obtained from the authors.
6 We included dummy variables to indicated that these values were missing. Previous analyses showed that these 
dummies were insignificant. We decided therefore not to included them in the analyses.
7 However the reading scores of all pupils of all private and public schools with the reading scores of the pupils of the 
public and private schools with more than 11 valid math scores hardly deviate and show more or less the equal 
differences between the public and private schools, both small and large. 
8 In fact, age is taken as a serious explanatory variable for pupils’ performance even if the grade of the target population 
was defined in a narrow way (15 years old). This is why a very precise measure of age in month is applied in the data, 
and only a three-month testing window was allowed for the data collection in the countries in order to ensure the 
accuracy of pupils’ age at the time of assessment.
9 Coefficient of private independent/ overall standard deviation= 28.56/99.5.
10 Coefficient of private independent/ overall standard deviation=23.1/96.2.
11 15.21/99.5; 11.14/96.2
12 We also examined to what extent the interaction effects we found differ between countries, by adding random effects 
at the country level. Only for the interaction effect between private independent education and fathers’ occupational 
status we found a small, but significant variance at the country level (.16(.13)). The other interaction effects do not vary 
significantly between countries.
